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NOTES
THE PRESENT STATUS OF CONNIVANCE AS A DEFENSE TO
DIVORCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The four usual defenses raised to bar actions for divorce are connivance,
collusion, condonation, and recrimination. Connivance is ordinarily defined as
consent to the miconduct alleged as grounds for divorce.' It differs from
collusion in that there are present actual grounds for divorce, rather than fic-
titious causes or concealed defenses; 2 from condonation in that consent is
given before the misconduct occurs, not forgiveness afterwards; 3 from re-
crimination in that it has to do with the very grounds on which the plaintiff
sues, not some other act of misconduct.
4
Connivance arose as a defense to actions for divorce based on adultery.
The act of adultery is frequently unlawful and always immoral, besides being
an injury to the plaintiff. Consent to the act is to some extent immoral and de-
grading; hence, the consent itself is corrupt. It is for this reason that the term
"connivance" rather than "consent" is used by the courts in describing this
particular defense. The scope of the coverage of connivance is much broader
than any actually expressed willingness, for consent may be implied from the
complainant's conduct. This concept of implied consent has proved a very
flexible one.5
The term, connivance, also includes cases of procurement and cases
where the plaintiff has actively participated in producing the misconduct.
1. Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 AtI. 34 (1896) ; Manville v. Manville, 81 S. W.
2d382 (Mo. App. 1935) ; Herriford v. Herriford, 169 Mo. App. 641, 155 S. W. 855 (1913) ;
Santoro v. Santoro, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1945). See also KEEZER, MARmAGE AND
DIVORCE § 299 (3d ed. 1946) ("Connivance is the consent of the complainant to the re-
spondent's commission of the offense complained of. A corrupt intent is essential.");
TrFFANY, DOmESTIC RELATIONS § 105 (3d ed. 1921) ; 27 C. J. S., Divorce § 64. (1941).
The term "connivance" is also used in other fields of law with a similar meaning as in
divorce law. See, e. g., Keith v. Wilson, 6 Mo. 435, 35 Am. Dec. 443 (1840) (connivance
at the disobedience of a court order by a witness) ; People v. Munday, 293 Ill. 191, 127
N. E. 364 (1920) ; State v. Furth, 82 Wash. 665, 144 Pac. 907 (1914) (connivance of
officer of an insolvent bank receiving deposits) ; Brandon v. Holman, 41 F. 2d 586 (4th
Cir. 1930) (connivance within terms of a cashier's fidelity bond) ; In rc Steiner, 199 La.
500, 6 So. 2d 641 (1942) (connivance by attorney with tax clerk for reduction of client's
tax).
2. Rapp v. Rapp, 162 Mo. App. 673, 145 S. W. 114.(1912).
3. Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 Ati. 914, 98 A. L. R. 1347 (1935).
4. See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 51 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9, 10 (1929).
5. Leavitt v. Leavitt, 229 Mass. 196, 118 N. E. 262 (1918) : "The right to a divorce
is barred because, the marital wrong complained of having been consented to, no injury has
been suffered." See also Pierce v. Pierce, 20 Mass. 299, 15 Am. Dec. 210 (1825);
Nacrelli v. Nacrelli, 288 Pa. 1, 136 Atl. 228, 229, 230 (1927); 1 BxsHoP, MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 521 (6th ed. 1881) ; 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 169 (2d ed. 1945).
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Perhaps most courts explain this in terms of implied consent, but it seems more
nearly like contributory negligence or assumption of risk. For if the plain-
tiff's conduct contributed in any substantial fashion towards bringing about the
misconduct, his cause of action is barred.
Because of the corrupt consenting by one spouse to an act by the other
in violation of the marital relation, a divorce will not be granted on the prin-
ciple of volenti non fit injuria.6 Also, the "clean hands" maxim in equity over-
laps both of these distinct ideas. 7 If the plaintiff has consented-corruptly-to
an immoral act, or if he has helped to bring that act about, he does not come
to a court of justice with "clean hands."
In a vast majority of divorce cases where connivance is interposed as a
defense, adultery is the alleged misconduct. The defense of donsent, however,
is equally applicable when divorce is sought on other grounds-e.g., drunken-
ness, 8 use of drugs,9 cruelty, 10 and desertion." Here, the corrupt aspect is
missing or not as strong, but the consent may be revealed either from an ex-
press willingness or from conduct which is a material factor causing the'mis-
conduct. In more than one-half of the United States, statutes provide for the
defense of connivance, and in most other states it has been adopted by the
judges as a survival of principles set forth by the English ecclesiastical
courts.
12
II. AcTs CONSTITUTING CONNIVANCE
A. Procurement
The clearest case of connivance occurs where the complainant has de-
liberately arranged and planned that the offense shall be committed by the
other spouse. The courts are completely in accord in this situation in refusing
to allow divorce-a result which probably will not be changed. "'A man who
6. In Note, 29 CoL. L. Rav. 799 (1929), the writer states that "Connivance as a de-
fense is grounded upon the principle that scienti et volenti non fit injuria, that it is inequi-
table that one should profit from his own wrong, and that a man seeking relief in a
matrimonial cause 'must come with pure hands himself.'" This statement includes the
principles upon which the defense of connivance is usually based. Dennis v. Dennis, 68
Conn. 186, 36 Atl. 34 (1896); Langewald v. Langewald, 234 Mass. 269, 125 N. E. 566,
39 A. L. R. 674 (1920) ; Leavitt v. Leavitt, 229 Mass. 196, 118 N. E. 262 (1918) ; Morrison
v. Morrison, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59 (1886); Benjamin v. Benjamin, 111 N. J. Eq.
400, 162 AtI. 612 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932) ; Sargent v. Sargent, 114 At. 428 (N. J. Ch.
1920) ; Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. 61 (Ct. Err. & App. 1870) ; Nacrelli v. Nacrelli,
288 Pa. 1, 136 Atl. 228 (1927). But some courts speak in terms of an estoppel: Oyama v.
Oyama, 138 Fla. 422, 189 So. 418 (1939) ; Riesen v. Riesen, 148 Ill. App. 460 (1909).
7. Nacrelli v. Nacrelli, 288 Pa. 1, 136 Atl. 228, 230 (1927).
8. Dorian v. Dorian, 298 Ill. 24, 131 N. E. 129 (1921).
9. Cf. Smithson v. Smithson, 113 Miss. 146, 74 So. 149 (1917).
10. Rosengren v. Rosengren, 115 N. J. Eq. 283, 170 Atl. 660 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
11. Cooper v. Cooper, 92 Mont. 57, 10 P. 2d 939 (1932) ; Heikes v. Heikes, 90 Pa.
Super. 312 (1926).
12. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAaXILY LAWS § 76 (1932). See Morrison v. Morrison,
142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59 (1886); Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass. 528, 5 N. E. 837, 54
Am. Rep. 488 (1886) ; Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. 61 (Ct. Err. & App. 1870) ; Note,
29 CoL. L. REv. 799 (1929).
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is so far forgetful of his own duties, moral and religious, and of all feelings of
honor, as to connive at his own disgrace by being a party to her adultery, does
not come to court of justice with clean hands, when he seeks a separation from
her on account of the conduct which he has deliberately arranged should oc-
cur.' " 13
B. Failure to Intervene
Where one spouse suspects the other of adultery and fails to intervene to
prevent the occurrence of the act, the courts are about equally divided on the
question of whether there is present an act sufficient to constitute connivance.
In Ratcliff v. Ratcliff,' 4 the plaintiff knew that her husband was having illicit
relations with a girl staying at the married couple's home. Many mornings
when the wife called her husband to breakfast she found him in bed with the
girl. Plaintiff at first merely remonstrated with her husband but finally left
him. In an action by the wife for divorce, the court held that this conduct on
the wife's part was mere passive permission to the acts of adultery and not
connivance. 15 And in Shima v. Shinz u,16 it was held that a husband's suspicions
of his wife, "his failure to put obstacles in her way and his desire for divorce
do not amount to connivance." 17 The cases in which connivance is not founded
upon a failure to intervene hold that the husband or wife may spy on the other
for the purpose of obtaining evidence,' 8 so long as one spouse does not lead the
other into a "fresh wrong." 19
For the other view, the court in the leading case of Hedden. v. Hedden,20
in holding that a husband was guilty of connivance for standing by without
interference when he had reason to suspect that his wife would indulge in
adultery, stated that "if a husband sees what a reasonable man could not see
without alarm, or if he knows that his wife has been guilty of ante-nuptial in-
13. Nacrelli v. Nacrelli, 288 Pa. 1, 136 Atl. 228, 230 (1927). Procurement is
similar to the doctrine of entrapment in criminal law. For the leading case on entrap-
ment, see Sorrells v. Uinted States, 287 U. S. 435, 53 Sup. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413 (1932).
14. 221 Mo. App. 944, 288 S. W. 794 (1926).
15. The court placed specific emphasis on the corrupt-intent factor. See also
Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass. 528, 5 N. E. 837, 839, 54 Am. Rep. 488 (1886), where
it was held that "the fact must be found that the libellant either desired and intended,
or at least was willing, that the libellee should commit adultery before the libellant
can be said to have connived at it. There is a manifest distinction between the desire
and intent of a husband that his wife, whom he believes to be chaste, should commit
adultery, and the desire and intent to obtain evidence against his wife, whom he
believes already to have committed adultery, and to persist in her adulterous practices
whenever she has opportunities." And in Torlotting v. Torlotting, 82 Mo. App. 192
(1899), the court said that it did not wish to be understood to hold that a husband
who suspected his wife of adultery is bound to try to prevent the act.
16. 130 F. 2d 809 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
17. Id. at 809. For a similar result, cf. Cochran v. Cochran, 35 Ia. 477 (1872);
Fisher v. Fisher, 74 Pa. Super. 538 (1920).
18. Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass. 528, 5 N. E. 837, 54 Am. Rep. 488 (1886);
Torlotting v. Torlotting, 82 Mo. App. 192 (1899).
19. Fisher v. Fisher, 74 Pa. Super. 538 (1920).
20. 21 N. J. Eq. 61 (1870).
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continence... he is called upon to exercise a peculiar vigilance and care over
her, and if he sees what a reasonable man could not permit, and makes no effort
to avert the danger, he must be supposed to see and mean the result." 21
C. Obtaining Evidence
Watching the guilty spouse for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an
adulterous act is permitted by a great majority of the cases, even though af-
firmative action would have prevented the act.22 A chaste spouse deserves a
chaste mate, and if one commits adultery without procurement or consent by
the other, conduct to secure evidence of the act should be allowed. The sus-
pecting spouse, whose sole motive is to secure evidence, should, without being
held guilty of connivance, be allowed to refrain from acting, in order that the
suspected one avail herself or himself of the opportunity for illicit sexual re-
lations. This conclusion will probably not be reached when there is a continued
course of intimate conduct between a husband or wife and another party.
23
In Engle v. Engle,24 the plaintiff deliberately planned to catch her hus-
band in flagrante delicto by making him believe that she was going away
from home for a while. Because of this ruse, the husband was found in an act
of adultery, and the court held that a suspicious husband or wife may take
measures to secure proof and that "something more than maintaining a watch
or hiring others to do so is necessary to establish either connivance or con-
sent." 25 While steps may be taken to procure proof, one spouse must not lead
21. Id. at 74. In Eames v. Eames, 133 Ill. App. 665 (1907), an apparent indiffer-
ence to acts of adultery was held to constitute connivance. See also Emerson v. Emerson,
12 Cal. App. 648, 55 P. 2d 1265 (1936); Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 AtI. 34
(1896) ; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 158 La. 48, 103 So. 438 (1925) ; Manville v. Manville,
81 S. W. 2d 382 (Mo. App. 1935); Tarbell v. Tarbell, 123 N. J. Eq. 581, 199 Ati.
57 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938). In Herriford v. Herriford, 169 Mo. App. 641, 155 S. W.
855, 857 (1913), the court said that connivance may be "passive permitting" but
went on to say that a suspicious spouse could take reasonable steps to obtain proof
of the improper act.
22. Engle v. Engle, 153 Ia. 285, 133 N. W. 654 (1911); Harmon v. Harmon,
111 IKan. 786, 208 Pac. 647 (1922); Vinton v. Vinton, 264 Mass. 71, 161 N. E. 817
(1928); Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass. 528, 5 N. E. 837, 54 Am. Rep. 488 (1886);
Torlotting v. Torlotting, 82 Mo. App. 192 (1899); Farwell v. Farwell, 47 Mont. 574,
133 Pac. 958 (1913); Fisher v. Fisher, 74 Pa. Super. 538 (1920). Cf. Karger v.
Karger, 19 Misc. 236, 44 N. Y. Supp. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1897), in which the husband
suspected his wife of adultery with X; the wife visited X at B's house; the husband
spied on the wife and X, waited until they retired to a bed and then rushed out of
his hiding place to surprise the wrongdoers. The court held that the husband had
facilitated the act and that he was under a duty to prevent the debauchment of his wife.
23. In Harmon v. Harmon, 111 Kan. 786, 208 Pac. 647 (1922), two couples
were together on many occasions, with husbands and wives interchanged for dancing
in the dark and automobile rides, an act of adultery took place and the court termed
this course of conduct as a form of connivance.
24. 153 Iowa 285, 133 N. W. 654 (1911).
25. 133 N. W. at 655. Cf. Torlotting v. Torlotting, 82 Mo. App. 192, 203 (1899):
"We do not wish to be understood as holding that a husband, who reasonably suspects
his wife of infidelity, may not himself watch her and employ agents to watch her,
for the purpose of discovering whether the suspect is or is not guilty, or that when
he suspects his wife is about to commit the act of adultery, he is bound to try .to
prevent the act; on the contrary in such circumstances we think he- may, without
NOTES1949 ]
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the other into a "fresh wrong" or place new temptation in the way. It is one
thing to permit, another to invite.26 The plaintiff must also be careful in his evi-
dence-seeking expedition that his actions do not proceed beyond that of a mere




Ordinarily, connivance will not be implied from mere negligence. 28 In
a recent California case,29 however, the court indicated that connivance may
be implied if a husband's conduct constitutes culpable negligence in not pre-
venting a marital wrong which later occurs. Also, the rule announced in
Hedden v. Hedden30 seems very close to holding that negligence may be
enough to show consent, for the court there held that if a husband "sees what a
reasonable man could not permit, and makes no effort to avert the danger, he
must be supposed to see and mean the result." 31 By the New Jersey rule
there is a duty imposed upon the husband to exercise vigilance in the care of
his wife if he is convinced that his wife's honor is being placed in jeopardy. If
he "makes no effort to avert the natural consequences of her conduct, he will
be assumed to have contemplated and acquiesced in the result of such con-
duct." 32 The desirable result would seem to be not to bar a' plaintiff from
obtaining a divorce merely because of negligence in failing to prevent mis-
conduct on the part of the defendant.
3 3
E. Desertion
If an act of adultery takes place after one spouse has deserted the other,
the fact of desertion standing alone will usually be insufficient to constitute
consent to the act.3 4 The reason stated by Mattisoit v. Mattison 3 6 is that
"abandonment confers no license on the deserted party to offend against the
being chargeable with connivance, permit his wife to proceed far anough in the commis-
sion of the act to discover to a certainty her lewd disposition."
26. Herriford v. Herriford, 169 Mo. App. 641, 155 S. W. 855 (1913) ; Fisher v.
Fisher, 74 Pa. Super. 538 (1920).
27. Vinton v. Vinton, 264 Mass. 71, 161 N. E. 817 (1928).
28. McMillan v. McMillan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524 (1935); SCHOULER, DivoRc
MANUAL § 155 (Warren ed. 1944). See also Warn v. Warn, 59 N. J. Eq. 642, 45 Atl.
916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899).
29. Emerson v. Emerson, 12 Cal. App. 648, 55 P. 2d 1265 (1936).
30. 21 N. 3. Eq. 61 (Ct Err. & App 1870). See also White v. White, 84 N. J.
Eq. 512, 95 Atl. 197 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915); Sturm v. Sturm, 100 N. J. Eq. 378,
135 AtI. 755 (Ch. 1927).
31. Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. 61, 74 (Ct. Err. & App. 1870).
32. Bingenheimer v. Bingenheimer, 66 A. 2d 327, 329 (N. J. 1949).
33. Note, 29 CoL. L. REv. 799, 801 (1929): "Errors of judgment should not bar
a trusting, if not loving, plaintiff."
. 34. Mattison v. Mattison, 60 Misc. 573, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1024 (Sup. Ct. 1908);
KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE § 516 (3d ed. 1946).
35. 60 Misc. 573, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1024 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
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marital vows." 36 Under statutes today the wife can compel the husband to
provide her with adequate support, and there is less legal or moral reason that
an abandoned woman should be privileged to commit adultery. The husband's
wrong should not authorize the wife to commit a greater one.2 7 Some courts,
however, have indicated that if the wife's adulterous act is induced by desti-
tution resulting from desertion, or if the wife deserts her husband, knowing
that he will then seek the embraces of other women, connivance will be im-
plied where the husband's or wife's conduct is a material factor in bringing
about the wrongful act by the other.
38
F. Agents' Acts
The cases are almost unanimous in holding that where one spouse is led
into adultery by acts or procurement of the other spouse's agent a divorce will
be disallowed even though the agent was not authorized or directed by the
principal to bring about the adultery.39 The suspected party must not be
led into a "fresh wrong" by the other mate or his agent because of suspicion
of a previous offense. When a husband employs detectives to "shadow" his
wife he bears the risk of procurement of adultery by them and may be barred
from divorce by reason of their unauthorized fraud. The husband is liable,
one case reasoned, because he should know that the first thing the detective
will do in order to trap the wife will be to furnish her with an opportunity for
illicit intercourse.4 In Dennis z. Dennis,41 the wife's agent hired a lewd
woman to lure the husband into adultery; although the agent was not author-
ized to do this specific act of hiring, his connivance was imputed to the wife.
One who takes advantage of his agent's unauthorized fraud is answerable
for it.42
36. 113 N. Y. Supp. at 1026.
37. Ellett v. Ellett, 159 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 861 (1911). There was a dissent in
this case, however, on the grounds that divorce for adultery should be denied the
husband where he has wrongfully abandoned his wife.
38. McMillan v. McMillan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524 (1935); Pike v. Pike,
100 N. J. Eq. 486, 136 Atl. 421 (Ch. Ct. 1927), 36 YALE L. 3. 1186. See also Fonger
v. Fonger, 160 Md. 610, 154 Atl. 443 (1931). In Richardson v. Richardson, 114 N. 'Y.
Supp. 912, 916 (Sup. Ct. 1906), the wife left her husband's bed and board knowing
that he would seek other women. The court held that "'Connivance' means 'winking at',
failing to prevent, helping by not hindering, taking no active hand, but standing by
and knowingly . . . promoting, aiding, and abetting the business. It is a state of
condition where all power, authority, influence, and action to prevent . . . are inten-
tionally withheld."
39. Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 Atl. 34 (1896); May v. May, 108 Iowa 1,
78 N. W. 703 (1899); Torlotting v. Torlotting, 82 Mo. App. 192 (1899); Lisle v.
Lisle, 128 Pa. Super. 533, 194 Atl. 207 (1937) ; Wotherspoon v. Wotherspoon, 108 Pa.
Super. 309, 164 At. 842 (1933), 18 MINN. L. Rav. 223 (1934); Smith v. Smith, 218
S. W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
40. Smith v. Smith, 218 S. W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
41. 68 Conn. 186, 36 Atl. 34 (1896).
42. Illg v. Illg, 78 Pa. Super. 212 (1922).
1949 ] NO TES
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
III. RESULT OF CONNIVANCE AT ONE ACT OF ADULTERY AS TO OTHERS
A. Subsequent Acts
It has been generally held that connivance at one act of adultery will bar
divorce for a subsequent adulterous act.43 In Hedden z. Hedden,44 the court
states that there is a distinction between express and implied connivance in
this matter: If a husband attempts to procure adultery and later seeks divorce
on the grounds of another act of illicit intercourse he should be barred; if be
merely permits or suffers acts which ought to convince him of his wife's guilt,
the prior connivance at adultery should not bar him from divorce. The court
further states that if a plaintiff has previously employed persons to have in-
tercourse with his wife, this is sufficient consent to adultery by her with others
subsequently, although no previous adultery be actually committed. One writer
has said that the result should depend upon repentance by the husband. If
the husband has reformed "after having induced his wife once to commit
adultery . . . it seems contrary to principle to hold that by so doing he has
fallen so low as to be forever unable to repent and reform in contemplation of
law. Such a rule would seem to license the wife to continue her adultery secure
from all restraint." 41 In the reported cases, however, there does not appear to
be any trend towards a relaxation of the earlier rule.
B. Prior Acts
It has been generally held that connivance at one act of adultery will not
bar divorce for a prior adulterous act.4 6 In one case, a suspicious husband
connived at illicit sexual relations between his wife and his brother; the
court held that this did not preclude him from obtaining a divorce for a
former adultery by the wife.47 In Morrison v. Marrison,48 it was stated that
no authority was found for laying down the rule that connivance at one adul-
tery is an absolute bar to divorce for a prior adultery; hence, the court felt
that each case depends upon its own facts, the character of the connivance,
and public policy.
IV. CONNIVANCE IN ACTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION AND
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
In actions for damages against third parties for alienation of affections 49
43. Morrison v. Morrison, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59 (1886); Woodard v.
Woodard, 41 N. J. Eq. 224, 4 Atl. 424 (Ch. 1886); 19 C. J., Divorce § 210 (1920);
KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 299 (3d ed. 1946).
44. 21 N. J. Eq. 61 (Ct. Err. & App. 1870).
45. Note, 29 COL. L. REV. 799, 804 (1929).
46. Morrison v. Morrison, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59 (1886); Bailey v. Bailey,
67 N. H. 402, 29 Atl. 847 (1893).
47. Bailey v. Bailey, 67 N. H. 402, 29 Atl. 847 (1893).
48. 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59 (1886).
49. Woldson v. Larson, 164 Fed. 548 (D. C. Cir. 1908); Prettyman v. Williamson,
[ VOL. 3
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and criminal conversation,5 0 the defense of connivance is available to the de-
fendant and the same general principles are applicable. Though the doctrine of
"clean hands" is not resorted to here as it would be in an action for divorce,
the courts continue to disallow an action for a wrong to which there has been
consent.
In Kohlhoss v. Mobley,51 it was held that connivance is established as a
conclusion from a line of conduct pursued by a husband in relation to his
wife's adultery; and that connivance by him sufficient to bar an action for
criminal conversation must be such conduct as, under an objective rather than
subjective test, shows an intention to connive, evidenced by his active or pas-
sive consent to acts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his wife
is engaged in imoral conduct.
Likewise, a wife who consents to her husband's sojourn into another
state in order that he might procure a divorce and remarry has been held not
entitled to maintain a suit for alienation of affections.
52
V. CONCLUSION
When it appears that there is no longer a possibility that husband and wife
will live together in harmony and happiness, and when all hope of reconcilia-
tion and understanding is past, it would seem better both morally and socially
to terminate the marriage by divorce. Marriage, when not attended by the
usual considerations of love, fidelity, affection, happiness and cooperation, is
a mere legal relationship which is useless both to the parties and society.
Should the doctrine of connivance always prevent the severance of such a re-
lationship? It is submitted that it should not, and that the courts should be
more hesitant in applying the defense of connivance to misconduct alleged
as cause for divorce. It would seem better to work out the problems of divorce
for the best interests of society and of children of the parties, without regard-
ing the divorce as being necessarily won by one party or the other. The con-
cept that "divorce is a remedy provided for an innocent party" 53 should not be
determinative of every case.
Where consent to an act of adultery is given once and divorce is sought
1 Penne. 224, 39 Atl. 731 (Del. 1898); Puth v. Zimbleman, 99 Iowa 641, 68 N. W.
895 (1896); Milewski v. Kurtz, 77 N. J. L. 132, 71 Atl. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
50. Morning v. Long, 109 Iowa 288, 80 N. W. 390 (1899); Kohlhoss v. Mobley,
102 Md. 199, 62 Atl. 236 (1905); Inderlied v. Bullen, 80 N. J. L. 7, 77 Ati. 469
(Sup. Ct. 1910); Lee v. Hammond, 114 Wis. 550, 90 N. W. 1073 (1902); Note, 68
A. L. R. 560, 575 (1930).
51. 102 Md. 199, 62 At. 236 (1905).
52. Nulsen v. Nulsen, 3 Cal. App. 2d 407, 39 P. 2d 509 (1934).
53. 1lankenship v. Blankenship, 51 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9, 10 (1929). In Bradway,
The Myth of the Inmocent Spouse, 11 TuL. L. REv. 377, 398 (1937), it is suggested
that "the rule of the innocent spouse has long since outlived its social usefulness . . .
and that the time is at hand to substitute for this outmoded rule and its accompanying
procedure a more efficient and satisfactory system of control of familial relations."
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on the grounds that another act has been committed, the result ordinarily de-
pends upon whether the act relied on was subsequent or prior to the original
consent. If prior, divorce will be allowed; if subsequent, divorce will be denied.
No reasoning is found to justify this distinction. It would seem better to
solve each case on its own merits without looking to see if the complainant has
previously or subsequently been guilty of consenting to marital misconduct by
the other spouse. Why should misconduct in a separate transaction have a
bearing on the outcome of the case involved?
While connivance and recrimination are similar defenses in that the plain-
tiff's own misconduct bars divorce, it is only with regard to recrimination that
a definite tendency towards a relaxation of the strict rule has developed.6
4
Perhaps the doctrine of connivance will be next to undergo a critical analysis.
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54. The strict rule of recrimination has in part been broken away from by the
recognition of the doctrine of "comparative rectitude." Stiles v. Stiles, 224 Ky. 526,
6 S. W. 2d 679 (1928); Trombley v. Trombley, 313 Mich. 80, 20 N. W. 2d 818
(1945) ; Urffer v. Urffer, 154 Pa. Super. 379, 35 A. 2d 580 (1944) ; SCHOULER, DIVORCE
MANUAL § 180 (a) (Warren ed. 1944); see Note, 63 A. L. R. 1132 (1929). Nevada,
by statutory provision, NEv. Comp. LA.ws ANN. § 9467.01 (Supp. 1941), recognizes
this comparatively new doctrine. See also D. C. CODE § 16-403 (1940); Vanderhuff v.
Vanderhuff, 144 F. 2d 509 (D. C. Cir. 1944) (construction of the District of Columbia
statute). Cf. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1506 (1935); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1275
(1942). The rule of recrimination is repudiated in Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N. M.
224, 174 P. 2d 826 (1946), 18 Miss. L. J. 471 (1947); Huff v. Huff, 178 Wash. 684,
35 P. 2d 86 (1934). Critical discussions of the doctrine of recrimination may be found
in Feinsinger and Kimball, Recrimination and Related Doctrines in fle Wisconsin
Law of Divorce, 6 Wis. L. Rav. 196 (1931) ; Bunkley, The Doctrine of Recrimination
in Divorce Law, 20 Miss. L. J. 327 (1949); Notes, 26 COL. L. REv. 83 (1926), 28
IowA L. Rav. 341 (1943), 29 MicH. L. REv. 232 (1931), 13 Oa. L. Rav. 335 (1934),
1 U. of FLA. L. Ray. 62 (1948). See also 21 IND. L. J. 53 (1945); 23 Tax. L. REV.
194 (1945); 33 VA. L. REy. 355 (1947).
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